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Abstract 
An emergent heterodox approach is challenging the prevailing orthodoxy of 
thinking, doing and governing economic development particularly at the sub-
national, regional and local levels. Underpinned by debates concerning 
institutionalism and a ‘new centrism’, the theoretical and conceptual roots of 
the heterodox agenda are drawn together. Several critical issues are outlined: 
the historical evolution of economic development approaches; the lack of 
coherency and consensus in conceptual, theoretical and policy terms; and, 
the underdeveloped empirical base and translation into policy and institutional 
practice. This discussion informs an analytical framework based upon the 
central dimensions of heterodoxy, experimentation, context-specificity and 
governance. Empirical analysis of the substance of the new heterodoxy is 
undertaken by focusing upon a new institutional experiment for organising 
economic development – the task force – and drawing upon evidence from 
the national (UK), regional (North East of England) and local (South Tyneside) 
levels. The argument is that there is a mixed picture with patchy evidence of 
the emergence of the heterodox agenda comprising genuine experimentation 
and innovation co-existing and inter-relating with substantial continuities and 
the extension and reinforcement of established practices. The study 
concludes that the currently dominant narrative and technocratic mode of 
economic development ‘quasi-governance’ requires a renewed and 
democratised politics to open up discussion of alternative responses to the 
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fundamental questions of what kind of economic development and for whom. 
Strengthened democratic structures as part of the devolution process in the 
UK’s nations and regions may offer the potential to begin this debate. 
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Introduction 
 
“I am the breadwinner in our house as my husband is out of work. I 
have been here since school and have no qualifications apart from 
working on sewing machines. What am I going to do now at my age? 
How am I going to pay the mortgage?” (Former Machinist, Dewhirst, 
quoted in (Clarke 2002): 1). 
 
In July 2002, clothing manufacturer Dewhirst announced the closure of its 
factory in Cardigan, west Wales, with the loss of 325 jobs held mainly by 
women aged in their forties and fifties. Dewhirst were following clothing 
industry-wide responses to cost pressures by shifting production to relatively 
lower labour cost places such as Morocco. Commenting on the “regrettable 
decision”, a company spokesperson said: “This is a direct result of the 
continued consumer pressure on prices that has led to insufficient profitable 
business being available to maintain our UK manufacturing at current levels” 
(quoted in The Guardian 2002: 26). Dewhirst was by far the largest private 
sector employer in a local economy blighted by relatively high rates of 
unemployment and few long-term job opportunities. Articulating local 
concerns, Elin Jones, Welsh Assembly Government Member for Ceredigion, 
said: “the response from the Government must be more than to send out a 
few consultants from the employment services. They have to look at 
reinvestment and regeneration. These are people who are skilled workers with 
a fine record of profit making” (quoted in Clarke, 2002: 1). Such incidents of 
job loss and economic decline are not unfamiliar issues confronting peripheral 
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localities struggling with the consequences of long run structural change. The 
existing repertoire of responses to such problems has, in some quarters, been 
found wanting. The conventional theory and practice underpinning the local 
and regional search for prosperity and wellbeing — through the sustained 
increases in employment, income and productivity that remain at the heart of 
economic development (Storper 1997) — are being confronted, raising 
fundamental questions for the theory, governance and practice of economic 
development institutions and policy:  
“The institutionalist agenda threatens the inherited policy approach in 
three ways: first, by placing faith in long-term, evolutionary actions 
which tend to span across normal planning and electoral cycles; 
second, by suggesting new actor rationalities to replace the reliance on 
standardized, off-the-shelf formulae applied mechanically by an 
unreflexive policy community; and third, by expecting policy actors to 
considerably broaden their definition of the factors of economic 
success” (Amin 1999): 375). 
Such challenges are informing an emergent economic development agenda. It 
is different in at least some respects from existing practice. This is due, in 
part, to its genuine innovation and challenges to established ways of thinking, 
doing and governing economic development and because of its extension and 
reinforcement of some well worn strategies.  
 
Economic development and its governance have been marked by several 
related changes that connect with the emergent agenda. First, it is claimed 
that there has been a qualitative shift toward a more ‘reflexive capitalism’, 
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characterised by heightened uncertainty and risk, influencing social agents to 
develop context-specific ‘frameworks of action’ to co-ordinate their activities 
(Storper 1997; MacLeod 2000). Second, there is a growing importance, 
diversity and complexity in policies and institutional forms at the sub-national 
scale (Sabel 1994; Amin and Thrift 1995; Cooke and Morgan 1998; Amin 
1999; Gertler and Wolfe 2002). Third, a ‘new centrism’ has emerged in 
economic development that seeks to move beyond state-centred 
interventionism and market-oriented liberalism as alternative forms of co-
ordination and organisation. It incorporates the “uneasy welding” together of 
sometimes problematic ideas including “competition and collaboration; the 
importance of supply conditions, especially training; partnership; a 
strengthened regional context; and the increasing importance of 
‘sustainability’ and community economic development” (Geddes and Newman 
1999): 16). Each of these changes is underpinned by two emergent and 
closely inter-related strands in the literature concerning institutionalism (Martin 
1999) and ‘heterodox’ (Storper 1997) approaches to economic development 
institutions, policy and governance.  
 
The intention here is twofold. First, to draw together and reflect upon the 
theoretical and conceptual roots of the so-called ‘heterodox’ agenda for 
economic development and its governance. Second, to assess its empirical 
substance through an analysis of a particular form of economic development 
policy and governance — the task force — unearthed in recent research in the 
UK. The material is organised into four sections. First, the literatures 
concerning institutionalism in economic geography and heterodox approaches 
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to economic development institutions and policy are briefly reviewed. Second, 
some critical themes and a preliminary analytical framework are sketched out 
to research the emergent ‘heterodox’ agenda. Third, an empirical analysis is 
discussed based upon economic development task forces in the UK and the 
North East region of England with a more detailed discussion of a particular 
example from South Tyneside. Finally, the conclusions seek to reflect upon 
the significance of the analysis for the broader theoretical and policy debates. 
The argument is that the evidence presents a mixed picture with patchy 
evidence of the emergence of the heterodox agenda comprising genuine 
experimentation and innovation co-existing and inter-relating with substantial 
continuities and the extension and reinforcement of established practices. The 
study concludes that the currently dominant narrative of ‘globalisation-
competitiveness’ (Lovering 2001) and technocratic mode of economic 
development ‘quasi-governance’ — substantially unaccountable, lacking co-
ordination and opaque — requires a renewed and democratised politics to 
open up discussion of alternative responses to the fundamental questions of 
what kind of economic development and for whom. Strengthened democratic 
structures as part of the devolution process in the UK’s nations and regions 
may offer the potential to begin this debate. 
 
Institutionalism and heterodoxy in economic development 
Reflecting a broader social science concern with ‘institutionalism’ in 
economics (Hodgson 1999), sociology (Block 1994) and political science 
(Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth 1992), economic geography has been 
experimenting with an ‘institutionalist turn’ (Amin 1999). Increased recognition 
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has been given to explaining how and why “economic action is socially and 
institutionally situated…[it] has to be understood as enmeshed in wider 
structures of social, economic and political rules, procedures and conventions” 
(Martin 1999): 3). Crucially, while such ensembles of institutions “are unlikely 
to be the sole cause of geographically uneven development they enable, 
constrain and refract economic development in spatially differentiated ways” 
(Martin 1999: 6). Institutions - as both formal organisations and as informal 
ordering structures - in tandem with processes of ‘institution building’ and 
‘institutionalisation’ have become central areas of interest in economic 
development (Wood and Valler 2001). This focus has underpinned the 
development of specific territorial/institutional conceptualisations of the 
localised and regionalised social regulation and governance of economic 
development (Martin 1999; Barnes and Sheppard 2000; Clark, Feldman and 
Gertler 2000; Goodwin, Jones, Jones, Pett and Simpson 2002). This work 
connects with the ‘new regionalism’ debate (see Amin 1999; Lovering, 1999) 
and theories of the ‘associational economy’ (Cooke and Morgan 1998), 
‘institutional thickness’ or ‘integrity’ (Amin and Thrift, 1995), ‘local and regional 
institutional regimes’ (Grabher 1993; Martin 1999); ‘institutional spaces’; 
(Martin, Sunley and Wills 1996; Jones 1999) and ‘local modes of social 
regulation’ (Peck and Tickell 1995). As formerly national institutional 
configurations are said to be fragmenting into more complex, multi—layered 
and decentralised structures around the sub-national scale, local and regional 
institutions are assuming an integral role in shaping economic activity in 
concert with national and supranational institutions such as the EU (Boyer and 
Rogers Hollingsworth 1997). 
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The current preoccupation with institutionalism links with a growing interest in 
so-called ‘heterodox’ approaches to economic development institutions, policy 
and governance (Amin 1999; MacLeod 2000; Sabel 1994; Storper 1997). 
Incorporating both 1960s Keynesian and 1980s neo-liberal approaches, the 
conventional orthodoxy is said to have been largely firm-centred, incentive-
based, state-driven and standardised — often centrally co-ordinated at the 
national level and peddling universal solutions (e.g. income 
redistribution/welfarism and entrepreneurialism/market deregulation 
respectively) to economic development concerns (Amin, 1999). Such 
approaches are considered to have failed and/or achieved only modest 
success due to their inability to secure productivity increases or implant self-
sustaining growth and their reliance upon the often debilitating impact of 
market-led adjustment. They were further undermined by their financial 
inefficiency, ‘bureaucratisation’ and susceptibility to political immobilism 
(Oatley 1998).  The ‘bottom-up’, decentralised and community-led economic 
development experiments initiated in the late 1960s and, with increasing 
European support, developing into the 2000s, signalled a break with orthodox 
approaches but were found to be lacking in terms of their capability, resources 
and stability (Geddes and Newman 1999). 
 
In addition to their already patchy performance, each of the co-existing 
approaches in the orthodoxy are thought to have been undermined by the 
increasingly complex, fast changing and uncertain nature of contemporary 
local and regional economic development. The context has been profoundly 
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redrawn by intensified internationalisation (even ‘globalisation’), shifts toward 
reflexive and more knowledge-intensive forms of capitalism, the increasing 
‘nestedness’ of multi-level, devolving governance structures and the post-
ideological search for ‘Third Way’ solutions beyond state and market (Boyer 
and Rogers Hollingsworth 1997; Storper 1997; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and 
Perraton 1999; Giddens 2002). A context of constant change, uncertainty and 
risk has placed a premium upon adaptability, learning and reflexivity within 
local and regional economies (Cooke 1995; Cooke and Morgan 1998). 
 
In place of the conventional and broadly universalist orthodoxy: 
“A new heterodox policy framework has emerged. This framework, 
while having many branches, shares a number of features. It favors 
policies that are context—sensitive, that is, interested in the 
embeddedness of industrial practices in specific contexts and regions, 
hence “bottom—up”. It is production systems oriented rather than firm 
oriented in its focus. It has a non—Cartesian element, one that accepts 
the diversity of underlying technological and institutional situations of 
different economies… …Key words that describe it include: networks, 
flexibility, decentralisation, co—operation, research and development, 
human capital, technopoles, and training (Storper 1997: 279).  
Specifically, “the policies are heterodox because of the kinds of public goods 
they would provide… …The new theory calls for policy to produce public 
goods, but allows that these goods may be specific (rather than generic) to 
technological spaces: it is their developmental properties (evolution along 
trajectories through learning) that ultimately generalize (via spillovers and 
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complementarities) their benefits to the wider economy and society” (Storper 
1997: 279). Chiming with the ‘new centrism’ in (Geddes and Newman 1999), 
the heterodox approach recognises the collective or social foundations of 
economic behaviour (in contrast to the conceptual individualism of the 
orthodoxy) and has been described as an ‘institutionalist approach’ to regional 
development (Amin 1999). The guiding ‘axioms’ contrast sharply with the 
orthodoxy and favour bottom-up, region-specific, longer-term and plural-actor 
based policy actions.  
 
Profound changes in models of economic development governance are 
integral to the heterodox approach. First, again echoing the ‘new centrism’, 
the more generalised shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ has dramatically 
increased the involvement of Non—Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs or 
‘Quangos’) alongside the private and voluntary sectors in economic 
development (Jessop 2001). Multi—agency and ‘inclusive’ ‘partnerships’ have 
become the chief co—ordinating mechanisms to address entangled issues 
beyond the remit of any single body (Geddes 1998). Second, devolution and 
regionalisation processes, for example in the UK since 1997, have redrawn 
the political and administrative structures through which economic 
development is governed (Goodwin et al. 2002; Jeffery and Mawson 2002). 
Such changes emphasise the rising importance and agency of the sub-
national level, animating debates about the ‘new regionalism’ (Amin 1999; 
Lovering 1999). The economic development’s position as an integral part of 
the devolution agenda has further underlined the significance of these ideas 
(Valler, Phelps and Wood 2002). The policymaking community describes this 
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as the ‘devolved paradigm for economic development’ (OECD 2001). Others 
recognise the heightened complexity and inter—relations inherent in multi—
layered, devolving governance structures working across, between and within 
a range of nested spatial scales — supranational, national, sub—national, 
regional, local and, even lower to the neighbourhood and community level 
(Marks 1993; Valler et al. 2002). Broad agreement surrounds the continuing 
— often decisive and pivotal — role of the national, central state (Amin 1999; 
Lovering 1999; MacLeod 2001; Morgan 2002). 
 
At variance with established and accepted beliefs and doctrines, the 
deliberately unorthodox, heterodox approach is fundamentally different and 
opens up a novel but highly challenging agenda for economic development. In 
particular, experimentation, context—specificity and governance merit further 
discussion and empirical analysis. The recognition in the heterodox approach 
that economic development has become too complex, fast changing and 
uncertain for rigid, standardised formulae has underpinned experimentation 
with new, innovative strategies and practices. The capacity to question, 
innovate and reflexively to learn from both successes and failures is promoted 
as a means of developing from established procedures (Cooke 1995; Gertler 
and Wolfe 2002; Henderson and Morgan 2002). Storper (1997: 274) builds 
upon the centrality of confidence and trust in his analysis of contexts 
conducive to such learning: 
“Small, repeated, experimental interactions may be useful for this 
purpose. Experimentation, as a policy device, means actually setting 
the parties to work in limited relations that facilitate learning and 
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attempting to build upon complexity. It does not mean trying to prove 
the utility of any general, abstract solution”. 
Institutionalisation processes are perceived to be central to ‘building in’ 
experimentation, often through ‘institutional searching’ (Peck and Tickell 1994) 
for ‘fixes’ – temporary or longer term – that can either enhance or impede 
(see, for example, Grabher’s (1993) discussion of ‘lock—in’ in the Ruhr region 
in Germany) the adaptive capabilities of local and regional economies (Gertler 
and Wolfe 2002). Given the accumulation of specific institutional structures in 
particular places that confer a degree of path dependency upon new 
developments, the extent and nature of such experimentation are 
indeterminant, contingent and remain empirical questions (Peck 2000). While 
untested, experimentation may be confined to relatively peripheral rather than 
mainstream activities and services. Similarly, the evolution and interaction of 
experiments alongside existing activities — the complex and demanding 
process of ‘learning by doing’ (Morgan and Rees 2001) — and the extent to 
which new experiments become formalised as ‘good practice’ require further 
analysis. 
 
Context—specificity is another central tenet of the heterodox approach. The 
orthodoxy’s formulaic, ‘top—down’ approach applied universally to all types of 
region is interpreted as distant, ineffective and insufficiently flexible or 
sensitive to address specific local and regional problems. Echoing broader 
theoretical currents that emphasise “more contextual, and less universally 
deterministic, accounts” and the need for “crafting geographically appropriate 
institutions, designing them for the local context at hand” (Barnes 1999): 14), 
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the heterodox approach focuses upon developing institutions and policy to 
deal with the specifics of local and regional economies. It seeks explicitly to 
recognise the particularities of place shaped by specific historical trajectories 
of economic, social, political and cultural change. Central to such an approach 
is a decentralised governance structure:  
“…that potentially empowers local knowledge, part of which is tacit, and 
this can never be properly accessed by decision—making centres 
which are external to the region. This, in turn, allows regions to design 
and deliver policies which are attuned to local circumstances instead of 
being the product of some centralized template (Morgan and Rees 
2001: 129). 
Distinctive ‘bottom—up’ approaches adapted to building upon indigenous 
strengths and endogenous growth potential have become integral to 
contemporary economic development (Geddes and Newman 1999; 
HMTreasury 2001; OECD 2001; Treasury 2001). While caution against relying 
upon simple policy ‘transfer’ is emphasised (Hudson, Dunford, Hamilton and 
Kotter 1997), the degree and nature of policy and institutional orientation to 
context, presumably across a range of scales, their adherence (or ignorance) 
of standardised, universal templates and their relative effectiveness need 
further empirical investigation. 
 
Decentralised governance models connect directly with the institutionalism 
and heterodoxy of the emergent economic development agenda. Novel 
approaches to strategy and policy have been couched within institutional 
experimentation in innovative organisational forms. As part of addressing the 
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‘wicked’, cross—cutting issues — including economic development — that 
bedevil formal bureaucracies, (Sabel and O'Donnell 2000): 3) discuss a 
‘democratic experimentalism’, framed by the national centre, that is: “neither a 
formal bureaucracy nor an informal network, yet it combines the capacities for 
super—local learning characteristic of the former with the access to the local 
knowledge characteristic of the latter”. Similarly, Amin’s (1999: 368) “general 
axioms of economic governance” emphasise policy actions to strengthen 
‘networks of association’ (rather than individual agents), encourage reflexive 
and adaptive behaviour, mobilise autonomous and intermediate organisations 
beyond state and market and sensitivity to local path dependencies. Such 
radical innovations offer the potential for heightened autonomy and diversity, 
enhanced context—sensitivity and greater transparency and accountability in 
economic development governance. Whether and how such developments 
evolve will be contingent upon the interactions between centralism and 
decentralism within more complex, devolving and multi—level polities at the 
local, regional, national and supranational scales in which power and authority 
are no longer clear cut, indivisible and absolute (Morgan and Mungham 2000). 
 
 
Researching the heterodox agenda in economic development 
Several reflections permeate an attempt to draw the disparate strands of the 
heterodox agenda together into a meaningful analytical framework capable of 
shaping empirical work. First, the economic development ‘orthodoxy’ is 
perhaps not as historically or conceptually distinct as it has been described. 
Despite underestimating the economic and political power of the local state 
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and trade union organisation (Eisenschitz and Gough 1993), the New Left 
‘restructuring for labour’ economic development agenda in the 1980s engaged 
in often genuinely radical experimentation and innovation — such as socially 
responsible production, collectivised and localised ownership beyond the 
state, worker-oriented education and training, equality and so on — that 
challenged the prevailing market—led ‘orthodoxy’ of the New Right (Geddes 
and Newman 1999). Such echoes can be found in some of the ‘new’ 
heterodoxy. Dissent, experimentation and muddling through have 
characterised the historical evolution of economic development through the 
co-existing and inter-relating currents of the mainstream and the margins. 
These need to be recognised rather than written out of any historically literate 
account of the demise of orthodoxies. 
 
Second, the heterodox agenda is as yet at an early stage of development and, 
in common with the ‘institutional turn’ (Wood and Valler 2001), is perhaps 
rather less well founded than commonly perceived. It lacks conceptual and 
theoretical clarity, exhibiting a degree of ‘fuzziness’ (Markusen 1999; Hudson 
2002; Peck 2002). As Amin (1999: 366) readily admits: “This is not an 
approach with a coherent economic theory behind it, nor is there consensus 
on the necessary policy actions”. If the only consensus appears to be that “its 
axioms contrast sharply with those of the policy orthodoxy” (Amin 1999: 366), 
the messy, less historically distinct evolution of approaches to economic 
development need to be acknowledged. For example, many of the 
conceptualisations of the heterodox agenda have clear links to the ‘new 
growth theory’ (Romer 1994) that builds upon institutionalist and evolutionary 
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development of neo—classical ideas dismissed as part of the orthodoxy, 
particularly the emphasis upon individual and collective economic rationality, 
market competition, endogenous sources of growth, increasing returns and 
the importance of disembodied technical change for productivity growth. Such 
links need to be explored rather than glossed over to examine the linkages 
between the orthodox and heterodox approaches. 
 
Third, the empirical basis and substance of the heterodox agenda in economic 
development is under-developed. Informative work undertaken has often 
drawn upon a relatively narrow array of case examples for analysis (e.g. 
Sabel 1994; Storper 1997; MacLeod 2001). Fourth, the translation of this as 
yet unclear set of conceptual and theoretical claims back into policy and 
institutional practice is beginning (Amin 1999; Storper 1997), contributing to 
discussion about policy relevance and political engagement (Lovering 1999; 
Markusen 1999; Martin 2001). It is claimed, however, that: 
“…the new policy orientations… …are not just the ex-post 
generalizations based on the experience of a small number of regions, 
but also ex-ante suggestions based on a particular 
conceptualization/abstraction of the economy and its territoriality. As 
such, the suggested actions are not crude (mis)translations of unique 
local experiences, nor are they – on the grounds that abstracted 
axioms never convert to mirrored practices – a policy recipe (Amin 
1999: 366). 
Such reflections about the heterodox agenda should not preclude its analysis 
nor render it unworthy of attention. Its implications for economic development 
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theory, policy and practice are potentially profound. The need for more than a 
set of somewhat vague descriptors is acute, however. Below is a contribution 
to this task. A preliminary attempt is made to develop an analytical framework 
based upon the main dimensions and characteristics of the heterodox agenda 
for economic development (Table 1). It makes no claims to be exhaustive. 
The intention is to begin to provide some indicative basis upon which critical 
and analytical work might proceed around this research agenda, allowing for 
the subtlety and complexity of the overlapping historical evolutions involved. 
What follows attempts analysis of empirical evidence of the heterodox agenda 
at the national and regional levels before — heeding Peck’s (2000) call for 
more longitudinal, ‘up—close’ studies of institutions in action — focusing upon 
a particular local example from South Tyneside. In-depth interviews were 
conducted with over 20 key informants from within the local and regional 
economic development community, including task force members from the 
public, private and voluntary sectors and national civil servants in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. This was supplemented by an audit of their 
memberships, strategies and other available secondary evidence. 
 
 
Table 1: Preliminary analytical framework for the heterodox agenda in 
economic development 
 
Dimension Selected Key Issues 
Heterodoxy - Multi-agency (e.g. level and degree of multi-institutional 
organisation, participation and co-operation). 
- Roles of the local, regional, sub—national and national state 
and quasi-state, private and voluntary sectors. 
- Forms, focus and objects of intervention (e.g. individuals, firms, 
sectors, production systems, territories). 
- Timescale (e.g. open-ended, task-oriented or fixed-term). 
- Policy and service provision (e.g. existing mainstream or new; 
balance between ‘soft’, process-based forms and ‘hard’ 
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infrastructures). 
- Level, type and nature of funding (e.g. in-kind and matched 
funding models or grant and incentive-based). 
- Type of assistance (e.g. discretionary and targeted or 
automatic). 
 
Experimentation - Extent and nature of experimentation with new and/or 
innovative institution building and policy piloting. 
- Extent of utilisation of existing formalised models, procedures 
and structures.  
- Degree and nature of departure from existing, ‘tried and tested’ 
practice.  
- Degree and nature of adaptive and reflexive action (e.g. 
institutional evolution). 
- Type and nature of assessment and evaluation (e.g. 
effectiveness, added value and synergy, balance between 
sustainable outcomes and one-off outputs). 
- Extent and nature of adherence to set formulae and plans. 
- Adaptation of successful and effective experiments (e.g. 
evidence of ‘Learning by doing’).   
- Responses to failure. 
 
Context-
Specificity 
- Recognition of local knowledge and path dependencies. 
- Extent and nature of orientation toward specific local, regional 
and/or sub—national context. 
- Degree and nature of adherence to standardised, universal 
and/or national templates. 
 
Governance - Origins, establishment and leadership (e.g. national, regional, 
local). 
- Strategy, aims and objectives (e.g. holistic, integrated; balance 
between exogenous and indigenous priorities). 
- Autonomy, co-ordination and regulation (e.g. independence, 
oversight, degree of centralisation/decentralisation). 
- Internal and external governance structure. 
- Inter—relations between multi—level institutions (e.g. local, 
sub—regional, regional, national and supranational). 
- Type and nature of accountability and transparency. 
 
 
Source: Developed from Amin (1999), Pike (2002) and Storper (1997). 
 
 
The heterodox agenda in practice? Economic development task forces 
in the UK 
The New Labour administration’s state modernisation project has been 
particularly enamoured with experiments in new forms of organisational and 
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territorial modes of co-ordination — Action Zones, Horizontal Working Groups, 
Inter-Agency Projects, Neighbourhoods, Priority Action Teams and Task 
Forces (Stewart 1999). This approach echoes elements of the emergent 
heterodoxy in its emphasis upon ‘holistic’ and ‘revitalised’ territorial 
governance based upon incorporating interest groups (‘Stakeholders’) in far-
reaching and inter-connected (‘Joined-Up’) approaches to intractable (‘Cross-
cutting’) issues (Mawson 1999). Task forces, in particular, have demonstrated 
‘bacterial growth’ with 295 established at the national level between 1997 and 
1999 to address a multitude of policy design and implementation questions 
(Barker, Byrne and Veall 1999). Economic development concerns have been 
central. The former Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions 
(DETR) established 39 (13% of the total), including the high profile Coalfields 
(CoalfieldsTaskForce 1998) and Urban Task Forces (UrbanTaskForce 1998). 
Perhaps challenging the traditions of centralised local and regional 
policymaking at the national level in the UK, there exists no clear, coherent 
and pre-planned ‘Whitehall template’ nor agenda for utilising task forces to 
organise economic development activity. National central government task 
forces are now recorded in an annual report as part of the ‘Modernising 
Government’ agenda for enhanced accountability and openness 
(CabinetOffice 2001) but this excludes sub—national, regional and local 
cases. In a pragmatic fashion, typical of the ‘English civil service’, task forces 
have been utilised where necessary — often as “bits of sticking plaster” — 
and have been useful in mobilising and articulating local needs to central 
government (Assistant Director, Regional Policy, DTI, Author’s Interview, 
2002).  
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In the medium to longer term, the question is how and where these bodies 
and the issues they address are attached to the existing institutional 
architecture of nationally circumscribed local and regional policy. Recognition 
of their utility is evident as part of more heterodox forms of organisation. In 
DTI nationally, such bodies represent the kind of task-oriented, adaptable 
organisational experimentation that it is felt may be needed to ‘re-engineer’ 
government to cope with increasingly complex and uncertain times (Wintour 
2000). Analysis of the national significance or otherwise of this ‘task force 
phenomenon’ (Barker et al. 1999) — what (Bennett, Beynon and Hudson 
2000): 6), referring to the Coalfields Task Force, describe as a “unique 
intervention in the politics of regeneration” — has been undertaken elsewhere 
(Pike 2002). 
 
In definitional terms, task forces are slippery creatures with numerous different 
names (e.g. Task Forces, Task Groups, Response Groups, Rapid Response 
Groups and Action Groups). Historically, they existed in de-industrialised 
regions and urban policy circles in the early 1980s (Keating and Boyle 1987; 
Greenhalgh 1999), including the pioneering ‘Merseyside Task Force’ (MTF) 
that represented “a hitherto untried mode of regional based combined inter-
departmental and public/private sector collaboration” (Lindley 1985): 70) 
reporting directly to a senior member of the Cabinet Office. The late 1990s 
variety recognise no linkage to their institutional lineage and echo several 
elements of the heterodox agenda: multi-agency; selected and invited 
membership; ultimately temporary but initially indeterminate period of 
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operation (at the local and regional levels) of normally less than 2 years; non-
statutory (i.e. non-Quangos); established for specific purposes; flexible and 
'rapid response' operation; and working across a range of inter-related levels 
(employer, sector and/or territory) (Pike 2002; Cabinet Office 2001). They 
differ from the commonly recognised partnerships flourishing in the 1990s 
because they have an indeterminately temporary life – existing long enough to 
address their stated objectives – rather than fixed life-spans from their 
inception and a pronounced crisis-laden flavour. Concrete instances of the 
heterodox approach is evident in the national outbreak of experimentation with 
economic development task forces at the sub-national, regional, sub-regional 
and local levels across the UK, including the Potteries, North Staffordshire; 
Prestwick, Scotland; Rover Task Force, West Midlands and Selby Task Force, 
South Yorkshire. Task forces have connected with the central economic 
development focus within the new devolved institutions and their need to 
grapple with the complex tasks generated by substantial responsibilities with 
relatively modest resources and developing institutional capacities within a 
multi-level, devolving polity. 
 
 
Task force fever in the North East region of England 
Economic development task forces have been taken up with particular gusto 
in the North East of England during a period of accelerated industrial decline 
in the late 1990s. By 2000, there were 27 (all but one established since 1997), 
operating at employer (10), sectoral (7) and area—based levels (10), involving 
a total of 351 individual organisational memberships (Pike, 2002). This 
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proliferation of new institutional experiments resonates with the heterodox 
agenda and is underpinned by an unformalised but nonetheless relatively 
coherent task force model that has evolved regionally through ‘learning by 
doing’ with a high degree of adaptability to local circumstances built in. Task 
forces have become an institutional mechanism for the rapid incorporation of 
a wide range of specialist agencies to address particular crisis-laden 
economic development concerns. Their aims were shaped by their particular 
context, circumscribed by their shared history within the North East.  
 
The origins and governance of the economic development task forces melded 
elements of both orthodox and heterodox approaches. They were the product 
of neither a simple ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ logic. Rather, they emerged from 
the articulation of inter-relations between institutions across a range of scales, 
moulded in their organisation and structure by their particular circumstances 
and selected, functional membership, and established for task-limited periods 
of operation. They were predominantly established either nationally or locally, 
although decentralisation from the national to the regional and sub-regional 
levels in their leadership is evident, with the local also increasing in its 
importance (Table 2).  
 
 
Table 2: Task Force Establishment and Leadership Levels, 2000 
Level Established % Chair % 
Local 10 37 11 41 
Sub-
Regional 3 11 5 19 
Regional 3 11 9 33 
National 11 41 2 7 
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Total 27 100 27 100 
 
Source: Author’s Task Force Audit (2000) 
 
 
Contrary to the new heterodoxy, the task forces utilised an array of largely 
conventional policy instruments delivered through the specialist roles of their 
predominantly public sector (especially local authorities and the local and 
regional arms of national Departments) membership alongside quasi-state 
agencies, private and voluntary bodies. Interventions were similarly orthodox 
in approach, targeted at short- to medium-run market adjustment as well as 
longer-run market failures and other structural problems across a range of  
conventional policy objects (individuals, firms, sectors and local economies). 
Accountability, co-ordination and transparency have been limited, leading to 
national and regional criticism of their contribution to the UK’s particular 
problems of institutional and territorial ‘democratic deficits’ (Skelcher, Weir 
and Wilson 2000; HouseofCommons 2001). The task forces worked in private, 
published few final reports of their activities (FujitsuResponseGroup 1999; 
EastDurhamTaskForce 2000) and received virtually no independent 
assessment. Narrow financial accountability was fragmented amongst their 
membership. Wider democratic scrutiny was largely absent, particularly at the 
local and regional level. The national task forces were accountable to the 
central government Ministers that sanctioned their establishment through 
Parliament. Co-ordination has been missing, even amongst organisations 
involved in multiple task forces. The local and regional dimension of 
accountability is lacking and it is unclear where such institutions sit in the 
increasingly multi-level, devolving governance of economic development in 
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the UK. Their proliferation suggests an ad hoc and ‘quick fix’ overuse, with 
attendant criticism of political tokenism, liable to be prolonged and recurrent in 
regions undergoing long-run structural change. 
 
 
A task force up close: ‘South Tyneside Redundancies — Rapid Response 
Group’ 
Drilling down to the local level allows analysis of the micro-level workings of 
an economic development task force and, in its national and regional context, 
an in-depth exploration of the empirical substance of the heterodox agenda. 
The South Tyneside Redundancies-Rapid Response Group (STR-RRG) was 
established by the Economic Development Team in the local authority - South 
Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council (STMBC) - in late 1998 as a ‘bottom-
up’, localised response to substantial redundancies at two of the Borough’s 
largest employers, VA Tech Reyrolle and Rohm and Haas, and the closure of 
the Onwa and Claremont Garments factories. Such issues were interpreted, in 
the current lexicon, as ‘cross—cutting’: affecting several agencies and 
requiring an integrated (‘joined—up’) approach. In parallel and overlapping the 
creation of the STR-RRG, the Onwa closure triggered the establishment of a 
separate task force by then Minister for Trade and the Regions in the 
Department of Trade and Industry Richard Caborn MP that Regional 
Development Agency ONE North East was “to lead an urgent review of the 
social and economic problems facing South Tyneside” 
(SouthTynesideMetropolitanBoroughCouncil 2001): 4). 
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STR-RRG bears many of the hallmarks of the heterdox approach. It aims “to 
co-ordinate the responses of partner agencies to ensure the maximum benefit 
and minimum damage to the affected company, supply chain, employees and 
local economy” (Pike 1999): 1). With a relatively small economic development 
function and modest budget, the local authority has been forced to work in 
partnership. STR-RRG is necessarily a multi-agency institution and is based 
upon co-operation amongst a localised network of relevant partners. It is 
flexible in its organisation and adapts to particular circumstances through the 
specialist but largely mainstream (sometimes statutory) roles and services of 
its constituent members (Table 3). Its focus remains conventional in correcting 
failures and/or temporary maladjustment in labour, land and capital markets. 
Its actions are largely orthodox too, firm-centred – irrespective of external or 
indigenous ownership - shifting toward redundant individuals for retraining and 
job search support and the local economy more broadly. The array of support 
services are largely incentive-based, publicly subsidised through UK and EU 
funds and standardised, mainstream services (e.g. New Deal), although 
targeting and some limited flexibility characteristic of the heterodox approach 
are evident at the margin. Local technological capacity is largely concentrated 
in the largest firms, and upgrading has not been a priority in the context of 
limited resources and the short term labour market concerns.  
 
 
Table 3: Member Organisations, Sectors, Geographical Levels and Roles* 
 
Organisation Type and Sector Geographical 
Level 
Role 
Benefits 
Agency** 
Central 
Government 
Department, 
Regional (North) Benefits advice. 
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Public Sector 
Business 
Link** 
Business Support 
Agency, Public—
Private Sector 
‘Quango’ 
Sub—regional 
(Tyneside) 
Supply chain development, 
identification of employment 
and skills transfer 
opportunities through known 
skill shortages at client firms, 
and business support activities 
(e.g. MBO, MBI, start-ups). 
Career 
management 
consultants 
Human 
Resources 
Consultancy, 
Private Sector 
National (UK) Career guidance, job search 
service and skills 
development. 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
Business 
Association, 
Private Sector 
Regional (North 
East) 
Training. 
Employment 
Service*** 
Central 
Government 
Department, 
Public Sector 
Regional (North) 
and Local Job 
Centres (Jarrow, 
South Shields) 
Unemployment registration, 
career guidance, job search 
service and skills 
development, vacancy 
identification and 
dissemination and training 
needs identification, 
systematic monitoring of 
labour market outcomes and 
New Deal main contract 
holder. 
ONE North 
East 
Regional 
Development 
Agency, Public—
Private Sector 
‘Quango’ 
Regional (North 
East) 
Linkage to Regional Economic 
Strategy and regional—level 
business support funding 
mechanisms (e.g. Regional 
Selective Assistance). 
South 
Tyneside 
Enterprise 
Partnership 
Public—Private 
Partnership, 
Public—Private 
Sector ‘Quango’ 
Local (South 
Tyneside) Attraction of resources and ensuring that the Council's 
plans for economic and social 
regeneration are supported by 
other agencies.  
South 
Tyneside 
Metropolitan 
Borough 
Council 
Local Authority, 
Public Sector 
Local (South 
Tyneside) 
Site and premises, Business 
information and support 
services, administration of 
South Tyneside Development 
Fund, political role through 
links with local councillors, 
MPs and trade unions. 
TWEDCO 
(Tyne and 
Wear 
Enterprise 
Development 
Company) 
Enterprise 
Agency, Private 
Sector 
Sub—regional 
(Tyne and Wear) 
Business legal and financial 
support for self-employment, 
buy-outs, start-ups. 
TEDCO 
(Tyneside 
Enterprise 
Development 
Company) 
Enterprise 
Agency, Private 
Sector 
Sub—regional 
(Tyne and Wear) 
Business legal and financial 
support for self-employment, 
buy-outs, start-ups. 
Tyneside 
TEC**** 
Training and 
Enterprise 
Council, Public—
Private Sector 
‘Quango’ 
 Adult Training (over 25) (e.g. 
vocational and management 
and start-up) and Youth (16 – 
24) Training (e.g. vocational 
Modern Apprenticeships, 
H:\lucy\papers\1-E&PA-P~1.DOC  27 
National Traineeship, and 
Youth Training to National 
Vocational Qualification levels) 
and New Deal programme 
funding via Employment 
Service contract. Training 
provider contractor. 
 
* New members from 1999 in italic. ** Replaced by Small Business Service (2001). 
*** Merged to form ‘JobCentre Plus’ (2001). *** Replaced by Tyne and Wear Local 
Learning and Skills Council (LSC) (2001).  
 
Source: Author’s research 
 
 
The heterodox approach was evident in the establishment of STR—RRG as a 
genuinely new experiment in multi—agency co—ordination fostered by a 
sense of urgency in the local authority to address the contraction of the 
Borough’s economic base. Prior to STR-RRG such events would have been 
dealt with in relative isolation by the relevant agencies with some duplication. 
STR-RRG was an innovative, untried approach to address a set of deep and 
recurrent economic development problems. Its creation reveals evidence of 
policy transfer and learning based upon the adaptation of emergent ‘good 
practice’, legitimated in its use by key institutions elsewhere in the region:   
“The idea was taken from the Siemens Task Force. Politically this did a 
lot and seemed to be the sort of model needed in STMBC. Since we 
had quite a few closures but no history of a mechanism to respond to 
rationalisation, redundancies and closures to make the best of 
situations” (Economic Development Team Leader, STMBC, Author’s 
Interview, 1999). 
STR-RRG provided a mechanism to ensure the timely meeting and co-
ordination of activities amongst the relevant partners. Each of the members’ 
specialist roles were formalised through a menu of support and provision to 
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embed co—operation, co—ordination and ensure seamless and ongoing 
service provision — both ‘hard’ (e.g. financial, legal) and ‘soft’ (e.g. career 
management, owner/manager relations) — tailored to particular situations. 
Close networks have fostered the familiarity and trust upon which members 
recognise and validate each other’s roles, build credibility through delivery and 
work more effectively together through sharing information. Experimentation 
was therefore evident but limited to the importation and adaptation of existing 
‘good practice’ and the co-ordination benefits of joint working. There was little 
or no genuine innovation in the specific policies each member was able to 
offer as part of their mainstream services. 
 
The degree of context—specificity of STR—RRG’s strategy was somewhat 
constrained by the short—term nature and depth of local economic problems 
amidst the broader backdrop of the declining industrial region of the North 
East. South Tyneside continues to suffer from an entrenched legacy of 
substantial economic and social decline due to the prolonged contraction of its 
traditionally narrow industrial base of coal mining, ship building and repair and 
heavy engineering reinforced by the lack of companies in growth sectors, the 
predominance of small and externally—owned large companies, few medium 
sized companies, a relatively poorly developed service sector and low rates of 
new business start-ups (STMBC 2001). It ranks 54th highest out of the 354 
most deprived local authority areas nationally 
(OfficeoftheDeputyPrimeMinister 2002). At 12.2% (January 2000) and 
persistently above both regional and national rates, localised unemployment is 
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a particular problem compounded by the particular economic and social 
character of the local labour market: 
“South Tyneside, and Jarrow in particular, has a poor labour market 
with limited vacancies and investment. Men are reluctant to travel. 
They are very parochial with respect to their travel to work area. 
Historically, industry was on their doorstep. They expect to live and 
work within the same small area” (Job Centre Manager, Employment 
Service - Jarrow, Author’s Interview, 1999). 
STR-RRG’s focus upon safeguarding and creating employment is therefore a 
context—specific response sensitive to the particular nature of the South 
Tyneside local economy. Such strategies are more generic and shared by 
other localities, however, in the particular context of the North East.  
 
Context-sensitivity underpinned STR—RRG’s effectiveness: “only local 
partners have the local knowledge and credibility” (Special Projects Manager, 
Tyneside TEC, Author’s Interview, 1999). Close contacts amongst local 
agency staff and employers was vitally important in filtering and interpreting 
the formal and informal ‘early warning’ signs, often from the local ‘rumour mill’, 
making judgements about the prudence of interventions in order to avoid 
destabilising situations, and providing routes into troubled companies. 
Timeliness was critically important as ‘getting in early’ often helped avoid 
outright closure and allowed agencies ‘hit the ground running’ when closures 
are announced. This allowed tailored support to specific circumstances. 
Overall, evidence of the heterodox approach is partial, with a degree of 
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context specificity mixed in with rather more generic, ‘tried and tested’ 
approaches utilised elsewhere. 
 
Similarly, the heterodox agenda is only partially apparent in the governance of 
STR—RRG. It mixes a degree of internal and external decentralisation at the 
local level with elements of nationally—configured centralisation in framing the 
autonomy of the group’s members. Internally, STR-RRG’s governance was 
originated and Chaired by the local state but relies upon a decentralised 
governance of a range of state, quasi-state and private sector institutions to 
deliver their existing mainstream services. Membership was ‘inclusive’ and 
formalised existing linkages amongst the relevant agencies. As evidence of 
reflexive institutional learning, the STR—RRG has evolved into a standing — 
rather than temporary — convened regularly to address the context—specific 
consequences of local economic decline in South Tyneside. STR-RRG is 
accountable to its local authority. Its activities are reported to the full council of 
Members and it is subject to oversight by the Resources and Corporate 
Development Scrutiny Committee. STR-RRG has a technocratic orientation 
with specialist agencies discharging their specific roles. The political 
dimension was only utilised through a letter from the Council Leader seeking 
clarification of the situation, expressing concern and offering the support the 
local partnership. Such a direct link to a democratically legitimate body may 
only prove workable at the local level in the absence of devolved government 
in the English regions (Pike, 2002). 
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Externally, STR—RRG was introduced into an already crowded multi—level 
institutional landscape governing economic development in South Tyneside 
(Figure 1). The local authority plays a central role holding the various 
partnerships together because of its deep local knowledge and statutory 
responsibility locally to promote economic, social and environmental 
wellbeing. While STR-RRG was below the national level radar, it was 
influenced directly through the national frameworks that circumscribed the 
roles and resources of its members. The governance of economic 
development in South Tyneside is therefore characterised by multi-layering, 
particularly following the strengthening of the regional level and the insertion 
of a sub-regional tier, and fragmentation and questionable effectiveness at the 
local level despite the attempts at integration.  
 
Figure 1: Key Partners in Economic and Social Regeneration in South 
Tyneside 
 
Source: Developed from STMBC (2000: 8) 
 
 
Conclusions: the heterodox agenda and a democratised politics of 
economic development 
The review of the heterodox agenda for economic development sought to 
draw together and reflect upon its conceptual and theoretical roots. This 
suggested several issues concerning: the need to understand the historical 
evolution of economic development approaches rather than clean breaks 
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between distinctive ‘old’ orthodoxies and ‘new’ heterodoxies; the lack of 
coherency and consensus in conceptual, theoretical and policy terms; and, 
the underdeveloped empirical base and translation into policy and institutional 
practice. A preliminary analytical framework was then offered by distilling the 
central dimensions and characteristics of the new approach - heterodoxy, 
experimentation, context-specificity and governance (Table 1). This 
framework informed the empirical analysis of the substance of the heterodox 
agenda amongst the economic development task forces at the national, 
regional and local levels in the UK. This presented a mixed picture with patchy 
evidence of the emergence of the heterodox agenda, chiming with an 
understanding of the overlapping, somewhat messy, historical evolution of 
approaches to economic development. Evidence of genuine experimentation 
and innovation co-exists and inter-relates with substantial continuities and the 
extension and reinforcement of established practices. 
 
Specifically, the findings revealed: the co-existence and inter-relation of 
orthodox (e.g. market failure and adjustment focus, individual and firm-centred 
intervention, reliance upon the public sector and particularly local authorities) 
and heterodox (e.g. multi-agency co-operation, task-oriented duration) 
approaches; a degree of institutional experimentation (e.g. the introduction of 
a new co-ordination mechanism, reference to policy learning from elsewhere 
in the region, realisation of the benefits of joint working) in tandem with a 
reliance upon members to deliver their specialist, often tightly circumscribed 
by the national level, mainstream services with little or no scope for 
innovation; and, a high degree of context-specificity to adapt to particular 
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circumstances (e.g. through the utilisation of local knowledge) mixed with 
more generic, ‘tried-and-tested’ approaches, particularly where the context of 
the local and regional economy shares a similar history of economic 
development problems. Internally, the governance of the task forces sought to 
be inclusive and decentralised but often ended up selective and exclusive. 
Externally, the economic development governance structures have become 
increasingly multi-level, more crowded with institutions and limited in 
accountability, co-ordination and transparency. This has led to the 
fragmentation and emergence of diffuse forms of authority and co-ordination 
attempting to integrate the emergent structures. The balance between 
centralism and decentralism is contingent upon their inter-relations and 
articulation across and between levels – local, sub-regional, regional, national 
and supranational – with the national state often playing a pivotal role. The 
continued proliferation of economic development task forces proceeds across 
the nations and regions of the UK amid controversy and debate concerning 
their uncertain effectiveness in public policy delivery and their contribution to 
institutional fragmentation and ‘quasi-governance’ with its attendant problems 
of accountability, co-ordination and transparency. 
 
While the heterodox agenda perhaps offers the prospect of thinking, doing 
and governing economic development differently – with both potentially 
progressive and problematic implications – its prospects are beset by deeper 
seated issues that condition the nature of contemporary economic 
development. Current economic development strategy in the UK is suffused 
by a prevailing adherence to what Lovering (2001) describes as the 
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‘globalisation-competitiveness’ agenda and its supporting explanatory 
narrative about the ‘new regionalism’. This dominant framework underpins a 
divisive and fragmenting process of competition at the local, regional, sub-
national, national and international scales for private and public resources and 
emphasises the institutional capacities of territories in seeking to embed 
increasingly ‘globalised’ processes of growth (Geddes and Newman 1999; 
Goodwin et al. 2002). While it has been tempered to a limited degree in the 
UK by New Labour’s allusions to ‘third way’ combinations of state and market 
(Giddens 2002) and an uneasy amelioration with the aims of ‘partnership’ and 
‘social justice’ (Kitson, Martin and Wilkinson 2000), the competition inherent in 
current modes of capitalist development remains central and frames current 
state modernisation and economic development strategies. Such inter-
territorial contest has, arguably, increased in importance as sub-national 
territories have been compelled to become agents of their own development 
within enabling national and supranational frameworks in the context of 
increasingly complex, multi-layered and devolving governance arrangements 
(Morgan 2002; OECD 2001). 
 
Underwriting this dominant narrative has been the increasingly apparent 
‘quasi-governance’ of economic development in the UK, magnified in the 
context of devolution (Skelcher et al. 2000; BetterRegulationTaskForce 2002; 
Pike 2002). Reorganised existing and new institutional structures lack 
accountability, co-ordination and transparency (Pike 2002). Embedded within 
these institutional structures and reproducing their overarching agenda in 
unproblematic and ‘common sense’ terms is a technocratic, professionalised 
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approach to economic development. This has been guided by the post—
ideological Blairite pragmatism of ‘what’s best is what works’ (Hassan and 
Warhurst 2002). Elected local authority members, for example, expressed 
concern about increasing central direction, ‘managerialist’ culture and the 
ceding of decision making power to external bodies – such as partnerships 
and task forces – that has downgraded the role of local authorities and local 
democracy (Wilkinson and Craig 2002). Predicated upon an ‘authority of 
expertise’ (Walker 2000) and perhaps overlapping with Lovering’s (1999) 
‘regional service class’, economic development institutions increasingly seek 
to operate in a wholly functional manner utilising bodies like task forces – 
proffering policy advice, spending public money and implementing public 
policy – that ‘depoliticises’ many issues that should properly lie in the political 
sphere. Criticism of such ways of working is often deflected by claims of more 
meaningful, ‘inclusive’ consultation as a means of engaging the civic realm in 
the age of declining faith in representative democracy. 
 
Together, the dominant narrative and mode of economic development ‘quasi-
governance’ operates in a substantially unaccountable, largely unco-ordinated 
and opaque way. Either unknowingly – or deliberately – this hermetically 
sealed policy universe risks foreclosing debate, ignoring dissent and 
marginalising discussion of alternatives concerning the fundamental questions 
of what kind of economic development and for whom? Such value-laden 
questions are inherently conflictual and may require not more technocratic 
sophistry but a renewed, democratised and potentially progressive politics of 
economic development. Such a politics and territorially distinct public policy 
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and governance may be emerging as part of devolution in the nations and 
regions of the UK (Geddes and Newman 1999; Adams and Robinson 2002). 
The strengthening of democratic oversight and accountability is beginning to 
influence economic development and its governance. In Scotland, Local 
Enterprise Companies (LECs) have been transferred from private sector 
entities limited by guarantee to public bodies to make them more accountable 
and to bring them within the legislative framework of the Parliament 
(ScottishExecutive 2000b). In Wales, the Welsh Development Agency has 
changed from a Non-Departmental Public Body (or Quango) to an Assembly 
Sponsored Public Body more fully within the purview of the Welsh Assembly 
Government. In the English regions, the voluntary Regional Chambers have 
been given the authority and resources to scrutinise their respective Regional 
Development Agencies (NorthEastAssembly 2002). Such developments may 
contribute toward a renewed, democratised politics of economic development. 
They may open up at least some space for debate, a degree of scope for 
doing things differently — locally, regionally and sub-nationally — from the 
national, the discussion of context—sensitive and progressive alternatives 
based upon the inevitably messy historical evolution of orthodox and 
heterodox approaches and the building of a more participatory determination 
of economic development priorities and policies. 
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